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This paper unfolds the development, functioning and governance of olive oil quality schemes in the 
domain of three cooperative organisations. Two questions are addressed: (i) how the construction of 
new quality schemes by cooperatives can lead to the fragmentation of the membership base and 
thus the need for new institutional arrangements, and (ii) how the development of these quality 
schemes alters the interdependence between parties (the cooperative organization and its 
members), and how this is governed. The comparative analysis shows the relevance of the social and 
cultural context in shaping the mechanisms of governance, as well as making some contributions to 
the EU policy debate around new food quality schemes 
 
Keywords: food quality schemes, EU agricultural policy, smallholder farming, olive oil, agricultural 
cooperatives, institutional economics. 
 
Introduction 
Recent changes in food markets are generally associated to the ‘turn to quality’ of consumers and 
producers. As Goodman (2003) describes it “… a movement from the ‘industrial world’, with its 
heavily standardized quality conventions and logic of mass commodity production, to the ‘domestic 
world’, where quality conventions embedded in trust, tradition and place support more 
differentiated, localized and ‘ecological’ products and forms of economic organization”. The changes 
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in consumers and producers concerns about ‘quality’ imply new practices in food production and 
commercialization schemes. 
In addition, the reinforcement of quality schemes has become recently a mainstay of EU policy to 
support semi-subsistence farming. Furthermore, it is acknowledged the vital role of these schemes in 
several European regions in providing diverse environmental and other non-trade benefits (Davidova 
et al., 2010). In this sense,  in a recent conferencei, the European Commissioner of Agriculture 
announced the proposal of new quality schemes directly oriented towards this type of agriculture 
('mountain agricultural product' and 'produced on my farm' quality labels), as well as other 
suggestions to support local and regional marketing initiatives for their food products. 
However, the assessment of several quality schemes (e.g. geographical indications, traditional 
specialties) point out the failure to adapt to very small-scale producers, since they are burdensome in 
terms of application, necessitate costly controls, and require adherence to a specification (European 
Commission, 2010c). Regarding organic production, a recent EU study (European Commission, 
2010b) also found out that organic farms where larger than conventional, which suggests that large 
holdings have advantages to adopt this scheme.  According to the European Commission (EC), this 
situation holds an important contradiction, since “small-scale producers are often associated with 
artisanal product, traditional methods and local marketing” (European Commission, 2010a).  
Consequently, the EC suggests that further study and analysis is needed in order to assess the 
“problems faced by small-scale producers in participating in Union quality schemes” (European 
Commission, 2010a), specially when new schemes (which could include a label for high-nature value 
areas (European Commission 2008) are under discussion.  In this sense, it is widely acknowledged the 
potential role that producer organizations (e.g. cooperatives) may perform in facilitating the 
participation of small-holder farmers. 
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The very concept of quality is the outcome of a process of institutionalisation. Quality is not inherent 
to the product, “is indeed a social construction and thus dependent on the socio-cultural, political 
and economic contexts within which production–consumption relations exist” (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 
2000). Quality is negotiated as well, therefore is not only context-specific but also reflects different 
modes of governance and thus different distributions of power in the particular food chain (Sonnino 
and Marsden, 2006). Additionally, food quality is in many instances linked to a concrete territorial 
context, i.e. there are territorial elements (identity, traditional practices, environmental conditions, 
etc.) that are incorporated to the product as credence attributes. In this process, actors play a key 
role in setting up the way those territorial attributes are valorised. 
 In short, the construction and development of quality are inherently linked to the design of 
institutional arrangements, which have to deal with the need of governing the growing 
interdependence among participants, and which will be subjected to power relations and contending 
interests. 
This is precisely the focus of this paper, which aims to unfold the development, functioning and 
governance of olive oil quality schemes in the domain of cooperative organisations. In this regard, 
two questions are addressed: (i) how the construction of new quality schemes by cooperatives can 
lead to the fragmentation of the membership base, so that new institutional arrangements are 
needed to accommodate a growing diversity of interests, and (ii) how the development of these 
quality schemes alters the interdependence between parties (the cooperative organization and its 
members), and how this is governed. 
For those purposes, we will utilise the conceptual tools provided by the New Institutional Economics 
(from now on NIE), which has demonstrated its utility for undertaking the functioning of several 
types of institutional arrangements in the agri-food domain, not only at the sectoral level (e.g. 
Ménard 1996), but also for the analysis of farmers’ alternative food chains linked to the development 
of quality schemes (e.g. Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2001). In this regard, institutional 
5 
 
arrangements do not emerge in a social vacuum; rather our results will show how distinct territorial 
contexts also condition and constraint the mechanisms of governance. 
Furthermore, olive oil constitutes a good example for the purpose of the paper for three main 
reasons: (i) production is dominated in Spain by cooperative organizations (70% of production), 
which in addition play an outstanding role on rural development (Fardiño et al., 2006); (ii) the sector 
is involved in a generalized effort to qualify oil productions (see Sanz Cañada and Macías Vázquez, 
2005), supported by the recognition of the nutritional properties of the so-called “Mediterranean 
diet”, within which olive oil constitutes the main source of fats (Martínez-Carrasco et al., 2004), and 
(iii) because olive groves are a very frequent crop in many Mediterranean mountain and semi-
mountain rural areas, where despite its marginal feature (low yields, too small and fragmented 
holdings, terrace landscape, part-time or retirement farming) continues playing an outstanding role 
in shaping traditional landscapes, as well as providing several environmental services (see Cooper et 
al., 2009: 49-51). 
Precisely, the county selected for this work (Alto Palancia, in the Region of Valencia, see Figure 1) 
illustrates this combination of characteristics. The county, where the three case studies are from, is 
made up of 27 municipalities, having 25.367 dwellers with a population density of 26 inhabitants / 
km2, though internal differences among municipalities exist depending on their distance to the 
recently constructed highway which has become a driver of a certain process of demographic revival. 
Within this area, three cases –corresponding to the three biggest cooperatives of the area, as well as 
to some of the most dynamic ones- have been selected: (1) the “Cooperativa Oleícola Alto Palancia” 
from Altura (cited as Altura from now on), (2) the "Cooperativa de Viver” (Viver from now on), and 
(3) the “Cooperativa Agraria de Vall de Almonacid” (Vall d’Almonacid from now on).  
As it will be shown, these schemes are about incipient initiatives: recently created, in relatively small 
cooperatives and with few (by the time being) farmers involved. Nevertheless, they constitute a 
relevant issue, since these small cooperatives play an outstanding role in sustaining this marginal 
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agriculture, and the understanding of the initial functioning of these initiatives can shed light on their 
future development. 
The research has been carried out through recorded and transcribed semi-structured interviews to 
tackle the several approaches of the analysed topic. Interviewees were: (i) members of the board of 
directors of the cooperatives, (ii) technical staff, and (iii) members of the cooperative (who were 
selected in order to cover the distinct situations presented in section 3). Interviews (15 altogether) 
were conducted between October and December 2009. 
The document is structured as follows. Next section introduces useful theoretical elements from NIE 
for the understanding of these quality schemes. Later, the empirical analysis is divided in two parts: 
first, the three cooperatives’ initiatives are presented, paying special attention to the way the new 
quality schemes alter the internal structure of cooperatives; second, it is analysed how quality 
schemes differently affect the relations of interdependence between farmers and the cooperative, 
and how this is governed in each case. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks.  
 
Food quality, interdependence and cooperatives 
Quality, interdependence, and governance 
The collective construction of quality is a process that increases interdependence among participants 
(producers, organisations, consumers, administrations). This is especially relevant on the supply side, 
i.e. among producers, processors, and sellers, namely because their involvement in such a collective 
goal leads to a process of asset specification (that can take diverse forms) which creates new needs 
of coordination and monitoring among transacting parties. NIE classifies asset specification as 
(Joskow, 2005; Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2002): 
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• Site specificity, that means that there are requirements that make necessary (or at least 
favourable) for the parties to be in close proximity or to be located in the same region. 
• Physical asset specificity, when one or more parties make investments (e.g. machinery, 
equipment) that involve certain characteristics that are specific for a given transaction, so 
that their use in alternative purposes results in lower productivity. 
• Human asset specificity, the transaction requires a high level of on-the-job learning (or 
learning-by-doing), so that resorting to the labour market can result in a drop of productivity. 
• Dedicated assets, i.e. general investments made by a party for the prospect of maintaining a 
transaction with another specific party, so that if the transaction does not take place, it can 
result in an excess of production capacity for the former. 
• Intangible assets, as can be the investments made to advertise a quality label of a processed 
product, which requires access to specific raw materials (e.g. obtained under certain 
conditions) produced by others. 
Other authors include an additional type: temporal specificity ii, which means that transactions must 
be carried out within a limited period of time in order to avoid a loss of value. 
As Ménard and Valceschini (2005) indicate, the selection of a certain mode of governance will 
depend on the Transaction Costs (TC) associated to the possible alternatives, and TC will depend 
upon the frequency of transactions, the uncertainty surrounding them, and the level of specificity of 
the assets that are transacted. Thus, assuming the frequency of transactions to be constant (yearly in 
the case of many agricultural products), as higher the uncertainty and assets’ specificity, stronger the 
incentives to increase coordination among parties, who will select along the market – hierarchy 
continuum. In this sense, several hybrid modes of governance emerge as possible (Ménard, 2004). 
However, it is also necessary to retain that the selection of the mode of governance does not 
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neutralise necessarily the frictions, since “competition persists among partners to hybrid 
arrangements” (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005: 242). 
This standard approach from NIE treats specificity as an ‘input’ or explicative variable of the selection 
of the governance structure. Nevertheless, other authors suggest an inverse interpretation. Hence, 
coordination could be also understood as the process that –aiming for instance to construct quality 
differentiation- generates specificity, which becomes in this way the ‘output’ of the governance 
structure (see Colletis-Wahl and Pecqueur, 2001). Our view is that this alternative reading is valid in 
‘chronological’ terms, but maybe not in casual-effect terms. Coordinating parties pursuing to 
construct quality differentiation know that asset specification will arise as an unavoidable 
consequence, so that they design the coordination mechanism needed to govern the new 
interdependence that specificity will create among them.  
In short, NIE provides a useful toolkit for this research, as it allows identifying the factors -and their 
attributes- leading to a growing interdependence among parties. However, it is necessary to avoid an 
excessively deterministic interpretation, i.e. a certain combination of factors necessarily will always 
lead to a certain mode of governance. Rather, our comparative analysis will focus on how resulting 
institutional arrangements are local specific, as they are ‘rooted’ in a certain social and cultural 
environment, which can shape the socially acceptable alternatives. 
 
Agricultural cooperatives as hybrid forms of governance 
Tensions and interests collide at the heart of agricultural cooperatives. Cooperatives are one of the 
hybrid forms of governance that can respond to the TC saving necessity (Ménard, 2004). In this 
regard, cooperatives also allow several organisational alternatives, where different degrees of 
coordination and integration are possible. The point is that different levels of coordination are not 
only possible among cooperatives, but also within a unique cooperative. Indeed, cooperatives can 
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embrace different governance modes, e.g. different sub-groups of farmers producing different 
products subjected to different arrangements within the same cooperative. Then, a cooperative of 
‘variable geometry’ emerges, so that frictions, that will need to be also governed, can arise among 
the different and partially overlapping ‘geometries’. 
Cooperative organisations, and namely agricultural cooperatives, have also received attention in the 
domain of institutional economics, and not only to explain through a transaction cost saving analysis 
which are the advantages of the cooperative form. Other institutional approaches (property rights 
theory and agency theory) have identified some (at least in theory) problems for their performance. 
Borgen (2004) classifies incentive problems in cooperatives as: (i) investment-related incentive 
problems, which would affect negatively the investment capacity of the cooperative, and (ii) 
decision-related incentive problems, which deal with both asymmetric information between 
associates and hired managerial staff, and potentially diverging interests not only between associates 
and staff, but even among different sub-groups of associates. 
However, it has been also argued that, in the case of agricultural cooperatives, several factors concur 
to lessen these problems. First, theorisation about investment-related problems forget that 
members of agricultural cooperatives “are –de facto- users rather than investors” (Borgen, 2004: 
389), so no comparison can be made with strictly Investor Oriented Firms. Second, decision-related 
problems obviate the role of identification-based trust –i.e. when “the truster fully internalize the 
preferences of the other party, and identify with him on that ground” (Borgen, 2001: 215)- in 
mitigating the risks of asymmetric information. Moreover, the literature depicts other factors that 
contribute to reduce the incidence of those theoretical problems: the homogeneity of the member 
body, the contingency between members’ and cooperative’s goal, the degree of members’ 
involvement with their cooperative, and the sense of belonging to the cooperative (Borgen, 2004); 
the fact that producers are directly involved in the governance of these producer-oriented 
organisations (Sykuta and Cook, 2001), and cooperative internal social capital (Valentinov, 2004). 
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Nevertheless, this literature also alerts about factors that can activate those problems, like the 
growth of the cooperative body -that can erosion the sense of belonging and trust and complicate 
the processes of collective decision making (Borgen, 2001; Valentinov, 2004), or the diversification of 
cooperative’s strategies with the introduction of new activities (rural tourism, energy generation) 
where farmers (and not necessarily all the farmers) are not users, but mere investors, and  increases 
member heterogeneity (Ortiz-Miranda et al., 2010). 
Finally, other authors claim against a simplistic and uni-dimensional theorisation of cooperation. In 
this regard, Mooney (2004) puts forward the need of a new theorisation of agricultural cooperation, 
which considers not only its economic function, but also its social roots. Furthermore, Mooney 
suggests focusing directly the tensions existing within cooperatives and to tackling them as “a 
positive force in their development, an advantage rather than a liability” (2004: 79).  
New tensions stemming from changes in cooperatives (new products, processes, strategies) 
challenge the capacity of these organisations to adapt, to create new and flexible institutional 
arrangements to mediate those frictions. And this capacity will be conditioned precisely by the social 
roots of cooperatives.  
 
Constructing olive oil quality in Alto Palancia 
Development and differentiation of quality schemes 
The characteristics of both the study area –with a tradition as second home and day-trip tourism 
destination area- and the farmers –many of them pluri-active commuters that maintain several 
personal networks in the urban areas where they work- have been traditionally favourable for the 
existence of several forms of direct selling, which has served to sustain olive production in the area. 
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The three cooperatives have recently embarked upon the creation and development of new quality 
schemes in order to relaunch oil marketing through new channels, as well as a way to overcome the 
decline of farming in the area. Nevertheless, the nature of these schemes and the internal 
mechanisms through which are governed present several differences. 
Altura is the only consortium of cooperatives in Alto Palancia, drawing together several cooperatives 
some of which are even from outside of the county. Therefore, this cooperative is the larger one in 
terms of number of associates (1,500) and milling capacity (4 million kg where milled in 2008). 
Besides conventional iii oil, which constitutes the main production and labelled from 2009 as 
Protected Designation of Origin “Aceite de oliva de la Comunitat Valenciana”, the cooperative is also 
producing organic oil (around 20,000 litres, organic and PDO labelled). Organic conversion was 
initially promoted by the cooperative among its members. In parallel, a new specific processing line 
differentiated from the conventional one was opened into the cooperative - a necessary requisite to 
be awarded the official organic certification. In spite of being granted a financial aid from the Local 
Action Group, the new line meant an important financial effort for the cooperative, as well as 
additional operational costs. In this regards, the staff of the cooperative of Altura acknowledges a 
certain informational gap between the cooperative and most associates regarding the real cost the 
cooperative bears for producing organic oil (specially the transaction costs associated to the official 
certification of the organic oil and the amortization of the investment). Then, asymmetrical 
information is managed here as a way to lessen potential tensions with non-organic farmers.  
However, the campaign to convince farmers to become organic did not achieve many participants, 
being the low profitability the main constraint. At present, according to the staff, the cooperative is 
interested on organic oil production mainly because it grants a ‘quality label’ to the own cooperative 
(to produce organic), rather than because of the profitability of oil (as the amount produced is very 
little and it is mostly withdrawn by the own producers for direct selling). Nevertheless, the 
cooperative keeps interested in increasing the number of organic olive growers. 
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Viver is a first grade cooperative smaller than the previous one (450 associates, 965,000 kg in 2008). 
Although the cooperative is also using the PDO label, it tries to differentiate its products even within 
the county. This is why it launched a new quality scheme (named ‘oil-from-tears’) based on 
attributes at both farming practices and processing levels: olive must be Serrana variety, the 
cooperative monitors crop treatments, the olives enter in the mill before any others, and they are 
milled without heating and filtering of oil. The oil produced under this scheme (where at present 
there are only 10-15 farmers producing 2,000 litres) is differently labelled from the rest of the oil 
produced in Viver. 
On the one hand, in the case of Viver’s oil-from-tears, the participation in that scheme involves some 
advantages for farmers: a practical one (their olives enter the first in the cooperative which reduces 
climatic risks), and a social one (a sort of reputation effect).  
Participation is open to all the members of the cooperative, who will be subjected to additional 
supervision by the technical staff so as to certify they are meeting new farming requisites. However, 
in practice farmers are invited by the staff, which selects participants on the basis of trust on both 
their “cooperative sense of belonging” and their reputation as “good farmers”. Then, cooperative’s 
decision-makers are shaping a different ‘geometry’ within the organization, which could potentially 
give rise to frictions with non-participants (those how are not invited, or who will have problems to 
fulfil the more demanding requirement). 
The last case, Vall de Almonacid, is also a first grade cooperative, situated in a small village -inside 
the Sierra de Espadán Natural Park- where there are associates from all the households, which 
reinforces the social integration of the organisation. It is the smaller of the three cases, only 140 
associates and maximum milling capacity of 800,000 kg of olives reached in 2008. Unlike the two 
previous examples, this cooperative opted for creating a unique product: extra virgin olive oil 
extracted from the local variety Serrana de Espadán, and coming only from farms located inside the 
boundaries of the Natural Park. That means that all the farmers are obliged –by the articles of 
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association- to fulfil these requirements, as well as to leave almost all their production for 
cooperative’s retailing (farmers are allowed to withdrawn oil only for self-consumption). In addition, 
since 2009 the cooperative is using the PDO label.  
 
Quality schemes, interdependence and mechanisms of governance 
As indicated in Section 2, the creation of quality schemes (and the consequent asset’s specification) 
is the outcome of a process of coordination. This section deals with the elements that conflate to 
induce alternative mechanisms of governance, and how are they tackled by cooperatives in the study 
area.  
Specificity is inherent for many agricultural raw materials. Farmers are affected by temporal 
specificity. Olive is a perishable product that must be processed into a relatively short period of time 
in order to avoid deterioration and value reduction. Contrariwise, there is no site specificity for 
growers not involved in quality schemes, since the own county provides farmers several alternatives 
to take their production –cooperatives mill farmers olives without requiring membershipiv. 
However, quality schemes do induce other types of specificityv (see Table 1).  
• Altura’s organic farmers have no other nearby cooperative having a specific processing line 
for their production, so –as there are certain unrecoverable costs during the process of 
conversion- they are subjected to physical specificity. On the cooperative’s side, there is no 
physical specificity, since the processing line can perfectly be used for conventional oil 
production. However, there is dedicated asset specificity, since the line was explicitly opened 
for organic oil, so, without organic olives the cooperative’s capacity of processing would 
become oversized. Consequently there is a high mutual interdependence between parties. 
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• There is also physical specificity for Viver’s oil-from-tears producers, since they must 
introduce changes in farming practices that result in lower yields that are expected to be 
compensated by a price premium or other management advantages (see above). In addition, 
the fact that monovariety olive production reaches a higher value when labelled as 
monovariety adds physical specificity to farmers’ assets (olive plantations). Contrariwise to 
Altura, in Viver there is not dedicated asset specificity on the cooperative’s side (no 
additional investments were made in the processing line to increase its production capacity). 
Nevertheless, intangible specificity exists in this case, since the cooperative cannot realize 
the highest returns of the effort to spread the label without maintaining a sufficient number 
of farmers producing under certain norms. Hence, the mutual interdependence between 
both parties is lower than that of Altura: farmers are not obliged to bear the opportunity 
costs of the two-year-period of organic conversion (so for them there are not sunk costs 
from one year to the next since it is relatively easy to revert to previous farming), and the 
cooperative can resort to other farmers to increase participation in the case of failure of 
those currently participating. 
• Vall d’Almonocid’s oil from the Natural Park holds some similarities with the previous case. 
On farmers’ side physical specificity of monovariety plantations combine with site specificity 
(since farmers are being settled more when transacting with the local cooperative that is 
labelling the oil as belonging to the Natural Park). Site specificity also affects cooperative’s 
position (it requires olives from within the perimeter of the Park), that in addition with 
intangible specificity (regarding the effort invested on building a recognisable reputation of 
the oil), stresses its dependence upon its associates. As in the first case, there is a high 
mutual interdependence, though it is even more intense on the side of the cooperative, 
which can not resort to other farmers outside the park. 
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Besides these (sometimes) unequal balances of interdependence, cooperatives have to deal with a 
situation of asymmetrical information regarding whether farming practices fit the requirements of 
the different quality schemes. Thus, unlike the traditional approach of agency theory to cooperative 
organisations -where the farmer (principal) has to supervise the cooperative staff (agent), in this 
situation it is the cooperative which must introduce institutional arrangements and incur in 
additional costs to supervise farming practices carried out by its members. In this regard, the 
selection of the mechanisms of governance is expected to be affected by the level of TC, but it can be 
only explained when integrating the role of social and cultural factors. 
The cooperative of Altura does not incur in additional costs to monitor organic farming practices 
(though farmers have to pay a fee to be certified by the regional organic agency). On the one hand, 
organic farmers are externally supervised by the organic certification agency, so the cooperative 
does not need to do this directly. On the other hand, there is no other near cooperative to process 
organic oil, so farmers’ potential opportunistic behaviour is discouraged because, if found out and 
not accepted anymore, the rise of transportation costs to other cooperative would be prohibitive. 
In the other two cases the circumstances are different since the schemes they are launching are not 
official (both oil-from-tears and monovatiety olive oil from the Natural Park are not public regulated 
labels). Thus, for the development of the oil-from-tears, Viver is resorting to an informal and trust-
based governance (farmers are invited, not obliged to participate), and liabilities and rights are 
informally agreed. The knowledge the cooperative has about associates, jointly with the fact that 
production is assured by trust mechanisms (which attenuates the risk of opportunism), makes 
possible resorting to informal agreements, and reduces the cost of monitoring practices. The point is 
whether this trust will be eroded as the number of participants will rise. 
Finally, in the case of Vall d’Almonacid governance is more demanding and complete The control of 
the ‘uniqueness’ of the oil (from a unique variety) is exercised technically by the cooperative (by 
proofing the variety before milling it), and socially by the mutual monitoring of associates (who care 
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about what type of varieties are being planted, what type of trees new associates have and where 
are located their holdings), reducing notably in this way TC borne by the cooperative. This reduction 
of costs allows the cooperative to pay more to farmers. In short, the deep social embeddedness of 
the cooperative, as well as the dwellers’ perception about this exclusivity that differences them from 
the rest of the county (i.e. the cohesive role of a shared identity) put these mechanisms of 
governance within the cooperative’s reach. This fact is also supported by the lack of fragmentation of 
the membership base, which attenuates frictions among diverging interests. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The development of new quality schemes by agricultural cooperatives requires the shaping of new 
institutional arrangements to govern the potential sources of internal tensions stemmed from a 
growing differentiation within the membership body (those farmers who participate and those who 
do not). In addition, new arrangements are needed to face the new interdependence between the 
cooperative and the farmers who are involved in such schemes. 
Quality schemes are more challenging when they are not based on a public certificate, since they are 
expected to imply higher TC; there are not third certificating parties assuming monitoring costs, and 
because norms and standards must be designed and negotiated internally. This is precisely the case 
of two of the schemes analysed in this paper (Viver and Vall D’Almonacid), which have shown how 
social linkages facilitate the design and functioning of governance mechanisms. Indeed, the TC of 
coordination and monitoring are lower in a context of mutual knowledge and trust, as demonstrated 
by the development of the oil-from-tears scheme, where the cooperative of Viver relies upon the 
compromise of selected participants (selection facilitated by the previous knowledge). In addition, 
the sense of belonging to the collective organization has meant the cession of power to the 
cooperative (as well as of the pre-existing personal selling networks which increases their 
dependence) in order to support the initiative of Vall d’Almonacid. Also in this case, the capacity for 
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mutual monitoring among associates and the social control exerted by associates to fulfil the ‘norms’ 
has made possible the successful management of this scheme. 
It is not to say that these processes are safe from internal tensions and conflicts that need a 
continuous institutional adaptation of cooperative organisations. However, Mooney (2004) maintains 
that tensions can constitute a very source of “strength, innovation, and flexibility” (page 81). 
Cooperatives are looking for creative solutions to maintain an otherwise declining agriculture that 
can result in the fragmentation of their social base. These new activities demand culturally and 
socially acceptable mechanisms not only to consolidate these new ventures, but also to reinforce 
social bonds, trust and sense of belonging which allow reduce TC and to contribute to the 
reproduction, consolidation and cohesion of cooperatives in their territorial fabric as a key rural 
development actor. 
Finally, the comparative analysis carried out allows to extract some conclusions regarding quality 
policy and its use to support smallholder farming. Altura’s organic scheme, in spite of being official, is 
being less successful than the other two (Viver and Vall d’Almonacid) that opted to local and informal 
schemes (where TC are expected to be higher). Actually, staff of Altura’s cooperative asserts that the 
scheme’s direct costs (membership fees, third-party inspection and certification) explain a part of 
farmers’ reluctance to adopt organic production, rather than the cost of the period of conversion1. 
This situation raises doubts about the performance of new EU’s additional and generic quality 
schemes (e.g. mountain or high-value area labels), since, at least in this research, the most successful 
ones by the time being are those that are non-official and that are performing under the basis of 
trust and social integration. In these two cases, the success also relies on their integration in local 
and regional marketing channels. Therefore, we could conclude that, in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of this sort of marginal agriculture, policy interventions should consider the support of 
                                                          
1 Actually, some farmers who had adopted initially the organic scheme decided later to give up not to face the 
TC of the scheme’s functioning. 
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these type of marketing strategies (short food supply chains), rather than in the creation of 
additional (and perhaps costly) food quality schemes.  
In any case, new quality schemes should be as flexible as possible to allow territorial adaptation, as 
well as to promote innovation (as shown by the two innovative informal schemes tacked in this 
paper). On the contrary, external regulatory and non-locally adaptable schemes could result in a 
discouragement of territorial innovation and local actors’ involvement. 
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Figure 1: Localisation of the three selected municipalities of the Alto Palancia County. 
 
 
Table 1: Interdependence attributes of quality schemes 
Quality scheme (cooperative) Asset specificity on the side of cooperatives 
Asset specificity 




(new line investment) 
Physical specificity 
(organic olives) 





(variety and farming practices) 




Site specificity (park) 
Physical specificity (variety)  
and site (park) specificity  








                                                          
i Conference of the European Commissioner on Agriculture on 'Semi-subsistence farming in the EU: current 
situation and future prospects' (14th October 2010 at Sibiu, Romania) (Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/ciolos/headlines/speeches/2010/10/20101014_en.htm, February 
2011). 
ii Though other authors (e.g. the own Joskow, 2005) argue that this is merely another form of site specificity. 
iii All the oil referred in this paper as ‘conventional’ is extra virgin olive oil. 
iv There are 15 olive mills in the county that accept olives without requiring membership, though obviously 
non-members must pay an extra cost. 
v The PDO “Aceite de la Comunidad Valenciana” cannot be considered at this level, as creating asset 
specification. The regional government decided to boost a unique label for the whole region, so that its 
development is not increasing mutual interdependence among parties. For instance, the investment made in 
Altura and Vall d’Almonacid to include the PDO reference on oil labels does not increases the dependency to 
certain farmers. In addition, production norms at both field and processing levels fit what farmers and 
cooperatives are already doing in this area so no changes have been required to fulfil the new regulation. 
 
 
